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The Government, when it came to power in 1997, adopted a monetary and fiscal policy framework which was intended to deliver low and stable inflation, high and stable economic growth and fiscal balance as a basis for fairness between generations. It is abundantly clear from the chaos of the past few weeks that the policy has failed. Given that the policy goals are unlikely to be criticised, the question addressed here is which parts of the policy need replacing or augmenting.
The overriding weakness of the failed framework is that it did not regard regulation of the financial sector as a macroeconomic issue. Instead the changes made by Mr Brown as Chancellor in 1997 transferred primary responsibility to the Financial Services Authority with it being given effectively the same macroeconomic importance as the regulation of utilities or commercial television. At the same time the fiscal arm of the policy, as well as being set out in a manner which meant that it gradually lost its credibility, did not pay enough attention to its key supposed goal, fairness between generations. Despite the criticisms it currently faces, including the points made by Wadhwani (2008) that it did not pay sufficient (or any) attention to the property bubble, the monetary arm of the framework has been its most successful component.
The international component of the current chaos is all too obvious. A coherent policy framework can be of only limited help if other countries' policies remain incoherent. It is important that some sort of international agreement is reached on policy goals and policy structures. Nevertheless our forecast shows the United Kingdom as the major country likely to be most affected by the financial crisis because it both has very high private-sector debt levels and a large financial sector. Better regulation conducted with reference to macroeconomic goals would have reduced both of these risk factors as would a fiscal structure which paid proper attention to fairness between generations.
Financial regulation
Financial regulation was seen by the Financial Services Authority as being a means of i) protecting consumers against the effects of asymmetric information and ii) ensuring adequate capital and liquidity to protect people from the effects of institutional failure and systemic risk. But the Financial Services Authority was not equipped to deal with a third important and interrelated role -that of preventing or at least damping asset price bubbles. The Bank of England retained responsibility for overall financial stability but was not in a position to manage asset bubbles by appropriate financial regulation. This is of macroeconomic importance since the aftermath of asset price bubbles is often damaging to the goal of delivering high and stable economic growth (see Wadhwani, 2008 for a discussion of the evidence). The issues are interrelated because if asset price bubbles are damped the risks of systemic failure are reduced; the failure of the UK's system of financial regulation was that it paid inadequate attention to the macroeconomic implications of financial activity.
Separately from the consumer protection aspect, there are three arms to financial regulation -regulation of institutional liquidity, regulation of solvency of financial institutions, and regulation of some types of transaction or instrument independently of the parties involved. The three types are, nevertheless closely interwoven.
It is possible, but unknowable, that if institutions' liquidity had been greater the crisis would have been avoided. We have in the past drawn attention to the fact that the Financial Services Authority did not seem to enforce its own liquidity rules (Weale, 2007) . The crisis has been most acute in those banks most dependent on wholesale funding and it might never have taken a grip if these banks had relied more on retail markets or had held more liquid reserves. But at the same time it is necessary to recognise that, in a banking panic, no practical liquidity ratio is sufficient to maintain the functioning of the system. Over the past year we have seen a broadening of the classes of assets that key central banks are willing to discount, culminating in the guarantees offered by the UK Government to the interbank market. This is simply a recognition that if financial authorities want to maintain a working banking system, they have to focus on the liquidity of the financial instruments that the institutions actually use, rather than on a more limited and historically determined range. Thus, as financial instruments evolve, either central banks need to widen the range of assets in which they are prepared to make markets, or alternatively financial regulators need to restrict the development of such instruments. This in itself provides a good reason for giving central banks the task of financial regulation and demonstrates the connection between regulation of financial instruments and regulation of liquidity.
However, the crisis has also exposed banks as being short of capital internationally despite the fact that the recent falls in key asset prices have not been as sharp as was observed on some occasions in the twentieth century. Solvency has been threatened by the opacity of instruments such as collateralised debt obligations and actual and prospective losses on advances to borrowers who had made geared investments in property and, to a lesser extent, equities. So capital adequacy regulation has been inadequate in that banks did not hold the capital they needed to meet plausible risks. The problem was of course exaggerated by the tolerance of off-balance sheet vehicles such as special investment vehicles and conduits which banks such as Bear Stearns found that they had to support but for which no proper capital provision was made. Goodhart (2008) suggests that the most appropriate form of regulation would have been one in which the capital requirements of banks whose balance sheets expanded rapidly were raised. The problem is now being resolved only by large injections of public money.
These issues may seem highly technical but they have considerable bearing on the roots of the crisis. Had capital and liquidity requirements been tighter and central banks/regulators more willing to inhibit some aspects of recent financial innovation, the returns to the financial sector would have been lower. In turn this would have meant that it would have expanded less rapidly. As a corollary, the international property bubble would not have developed to the extent that it did, and the aftermath which we now face would therefore have been less damaging.
There are two other aspects of financial regulation which should be mentioned. First of all, there is a good case for regulating wholesale products. The past few weeks have exposed the public as guarantor of last resort. The public should therefore take a view on the risks it wants to be exposed to. The European Economic Area suffers from the fact that financial institutions are able to trade cross-border, such as the Icelandic banks in the United Kingdom. They do have to obey EU directives, but there is no unified framework for financial regulation, a problem identified by Barrell and Davis (2005) . The traditional principle is that host countries concern themselves with the liquidity of foreign banks, while parent countries concern themselves with solvency with, in this case disastrous consequences. On the other hand, given that the UK Treasury saw no reason to alert local authorities and other investors to the risks they were running, one cannot be confident that domestic oversight would have worked better. But a framework for the European Economic Area would presumably recognise that banking systems all rely, to some extent, on backstop guarantees provided by the countries in which they are incorporated, so that banks cannot be allowed to expand out of line with the capacity of countries to provide such guarantees. This raises obvious questions about both Luxembourg and Switzerland.
Secondly, if one of the purposes of financial regulation is, working with monetary policy, to damp asset bubbles, it needs to be recognised that regulation of transactions may be an important complement to regulation of institutions as well as an aspect of managing liquidity. The conventional view is that regulation of transactions is ineffective because it can only be voluntary and is therefore evaded. But if regulations are designed so that lenders who do not comply with them risk being unable to recover their loans, then such regulations become self-enforcing and effective. This may be particularly pertinent when applied to retail loans made by financial institutions. In turn it can become a vehicle for influencing domestic saving and thus reducing some of the international imbalances as we discuss below.
Fiscal policy
The general concerns over fiscal policy are easy to understand; they essentially highlight flaws with the specific framework that the Government adopted in 1997 rather than with the general principle of aiming to achieve budget balance by means of appropriate adjustment of public spending and taxation. The Government has, up to now, claimed that its fiscal target of balancing the current account over the cycle would be met, on the basis of its own forecasts for tax revenues, while brushing aside criticism that these were too optimistic. As we have made clear for several years, the gap between our own more pessimistic forecasts and those of the Treasury was much less than the general uncertainty surrounding budget projections. Thus the problem is not so much that the Treasury forecasts may probably turn out to be badly wrong, but rather that there was no mechanism for explaining how factors such as disappointing tax revenues would be addressed. This was an important factor behind the lack of credibility in the structure.
A second problem arose from the reliance of the fiscal rule on budget balance over the economic cycle. Just as forecasts of budget deficits are inaccurate, so too are both forecasts and current measures of the economic cycle. This aspect was aggravated by the fact that the Treasury chose a method for measuring the economic cycle very different from standard techniques, giving rise to an inevitable perception that it was subject to political manipulation so as to ensure that the target could be met. A policy which aimed to achieve a particular fiscal target in a forward-looking way 'taking one year with another' would be much more satisfactory. The need for independent assessment of the situation is also very strong.
It is, nevertheless, worth standing back from the mechanisms by which a target such as current budget balance should be given effect to think again about the appropriate fiscal structure. There is a good argument that, rather than aim to achieve budget balance in any particular interval or to any particular time, the Government should aim to keep expected future tax rates constant (Flemming, 1988) . This has two immediate implications. First of all, if government spending is subject to future pressures as a result, say, of Civil Service pensions or population change, then in the short term the Government should anticipate these by running a budget surplus. There would undoubtedly be room for debate about the precise nature of the calculations by which the required tax rates would be calculated, but this is not, in itself, a case for ignoring the argument. Secondly, if the economy is subject to intermittent disturbances, then in normal years one would expect to see a current budget surplus, with a deficit in abnormal years. Once again, estimates of the magnitude and frequency of disturbances will be subject to debate. But if they are associated with economic recessions, then these are sufficiently frequent for estimates of some sort to be produced. At the same time they are plainly less frequent than the period of normal economic cycles. Setting policy on the basis of such calculations, however imperfect it is, is better than ignoring the issue. Had this policy been applied from 1997 onwards, there seems little doubt that most years from 1997 to 2007 would have been regarded as normal, requiring current surpluses. In the middle of the decade, fiscal management would have resulted in the Government saving for the future instead of spending the unexpected surplus accrued around the turn of the century.
There are, undoubtedly some problems. If low-spending governments alternate with high-spending governments, the former are unlikely to see why they should collect taxes some of which are intended to pay for the spending of the latter. But even if the rule were imposed on the assumption that current government policy would continue, that would almost certainly be an improvement on a rule with a shorter focus.
This analysis, with its focus on government saving, however, assumes that the private sector is best left to make its own savings decisions. Thus, if private saving is low for long periods, the presumption is that the Government will simply leave the private sector to bear the consequences, which are likely to emerge in terms of disappointment about future income. It is questionable whether such a policy is credible. In 1980 the Government decided to index state pensions to prices rather than wages, with the presumption that private saving would rise so that people could support themselves adequately. But saving did not rise. Instead the subsequent fifteen years saw rising pensioner poverty and, after the 1997 election, the Labour Government introduced the Minimum Income Guarantee which developed into the Pension Credit as a vehicle for further pay-as-you-go payments to pensioners.
An alternative is therefore that fiscal policy should be set with reference to the overall savings needs of the country. Khoman and Weale (2008) show how these can be assessed making straightforward assumptions about the relations between current consumption patterns and future consumption plans and suggest that there is at present a very substantial savings shortfall, which they put at about 6 per cent of GDP. If the Government were to take on the whole job of raising national saving, the current budget surplus would need, at least in normal years, to increase by this amount. It is hard to imagine that this is politically possible, let alone being able to provide an extra margin for abnormal years. Thus the practical resolution of the problem is that the public sector should go as far as it can in contributing to national saving, while recognising that, if measures to promote private saving are not also successful, there will be pressure for a move towards pay-as-you-go benefit payments in the future.
In practice, it may be difficult to explain to a public which is used to government budgets and even current budgets being in deficit, that a shift to surplus is needed. Economists generally, and with good reason, dislike hypothecation and splitting of the government budget into a range of different and ring-fenced funds. Nevertheless, for political and presentational reasons, it is probably sensible to set up a futures fund into which regular payments would be made out of current revenue. The budgetary target might then be defined as current account balance after netting off payments into the futures fund and assessed with reference to future prospects rather than to the recent past.
The minimum inflow into the fund might then be defined with reference not only to changes in government commitments arising from demographic change, given current tax, benefit and public consumption arrangements, but also with reference to the likely upward pressures on benefits which would arise given current levels of private saving. This would still be consistent with the notion of keeping expected future tax rates constant, but simply taking a more realistic view of the political pressures on future spending.
It should be noted that the setting of fiscal targets with reference to national savings needs -or at least the operation of futures funds -will tend to mitigate global imbalances. The countries with large external deficits such as the United States and the United Kingdom have generally been those with low or very low saving. Had their levels of national saving been higher their deficits would have been much reduced.
The impact of much weaker economic performance on the fiscal position is substantial. We now expect the deficit on the current account to rise to 3.7 per cent of GDP and the national debt as a proportion of GDP to rise to 55 per cent of GDP by 2010. These problems of course reflect the existing fiscal difficulties which have their roots in the treatment of the surge in tax revenues around 2000 as a permanent increase in revenue rather than a temporary and poorly explained surge.
Monetary policy
There is probably also a weaker consensus over monetary policy than there has been since the opposition parties accepted Bank of England independence, in part because of the probably mistaken belief that interest rate changes can play a major role in easing the current crisis. There is widespread comment that monetary policy should take growth prospects as well as inflation into account, rather than to see growth as a subsidiary objective to which attention is paid only when inflation is under control. Unfavourable comparisons are sometimes made with the Federal Reserve Bank of the United States despite the fact that the low interest rate pro-growth policies adopted there in the middle years of the decade are almost certainly one of the factors behind the current financial crisis.
The basic arguments for an inflation target are that inflation is best kept under control when people expect it to be kept under control. As Wadhwani (2008) argues convincingly, this does not rule out allowing monetary policy, as well as financial regulation, to respond to asset price bubbles. But a policy authority which also has a growth mandate is likely to try to deliver inflation higher than expected. But eventually people will take this into account, and inflation will rise to the point where the monetary authority cannot tolerate it rising any further. But since there is no reason to believe that inflation will help the supply side of the economy, the eventual outcome will be high inflation with a growth rate set by the supply side rather than low inflation with a growth rate set by the supply side (Barro and Gordon, 1983) . If, as is sometimes claimed, inflation damages supply performance, then economic growth will eventually be damaged by a short-term pro-growth policy.
The practical difficulties of a 'pro-growth' monetary policy are legion. If a growth target were set at a specific level, such as 2½ per cent per annum, there is no reason to believe that it could be chosen to be compatible with the underlying trend growth of the economy, because the latter cannot be measured satisfactorily except with a long period of hindsight. Much the same problem arises with trying to measure an output gap; it is therefore not practical to define a monetary policy rule with respect to this either.
We are not aware that supporters of a monetary framework which pays attention to growth as well as inflation have addressed these points. Their argument seems to be simply the short-term point that, if the Bank of England did not worry that inflation was so far above target, it could have cut interest rates to support the growth rate. This line of reasoning is a good (or bad) example of an inability to distinguish an apparent short-term benefit from the implications of a risky policy structure. This is not to say that inflation-targeting is the only coherent means of running monetary policy. One alternative (Meade, 1978) is to target money GDP. This has the consequence that, when economic growth is weak, monetary policy will be more accommodative than it would be if inflation were targeted, with the converse being true if economic growth were buoyant. It is also the case that policy would not respond directly to movements in import prices since changes in money GDP arise from changes to domestic costs and changes to the volume of output. Both of these points might lead people to conclude that it would have provided a better policy target than does inflation-targeting. But on the downside, it is not as easy to understand and GDP figures are subject to sometimes large revisions. Another possibility is price-level targeting. This could be seen as a generalisation of the Gold Standard. That targeted the price of gold, while, with price-level targeting, a target path would be defined for the bundle of commodities which make up an appropriate price index, such as the RPI or the CPI. Price-level targeting has the advantage over inflation targeting that it reduces the uncertainty surrounding long-term contracts. With effective price-level targeting people know that the real value associated with any nominal long-term contract, such as a long-term debt, will not change unexpectedly between the start and the end of the contract. But the disadvantage, in comparison to inflation targeting, is that periods of undesirably rapid inflation have to be followed by periods of very low inflation in order to keep the price level close to its target path. In some circumstances this may prove costly in terms of output foregone, and it is a matter of informed judgement whether the costs associated with this are likely to outweigh the benefits of the certainty surrounding longterm contracts. Despite this Svensson (1999) argues that it is likely to be superior to inflation targeting. It is certainly the case, however, that, unlike money GDP targeting, this arrangement will not appeal to those who find the current arrangements too restrictive.
The current position and the economic outlook
It would be impossible to set out a framework such as this without some observations on how it would be applied in the current circumstances. The recent performance of the economy is undoubtedly very weak, with the National Institute's flash estimate of GDP showing a fall of 0.2 per cent in the third quarter of this year. Looking ahead, the outcome depends very much on how far and for how long bank lending is restricted as a result of the credit crisis as well as on the outcome of other depressing influences, such as falling house prices, interacting with a more general attempt by households to put their balance sheets on a firmer footing. Plainly the recent past is not likely to be a very good guide to this. The UK bank bailout requires banks to resume lending to household and small businesses, on terms that they can afford, as the Prime Minister put it. But credit is bound to be tighter than it has been recently and this limits spending and thus economic activity. Our forecast assumes that the lack of availability of credit restricts economic growth next year, with a consequent continuing decline of nearly 1 per cent. There is plainly the possibility that the effects of credit restriction could be more or less than this, depending in part on how successful the Government is at restoring the flow of credit.
With a contraction of private borrowing likely there is a good case to be made that public borrowing should expand to make up at least some of the gap. Thus, although a large current deficit is likely, we are not arguing for an immediate tightening of the fiscal position. Rather the current circumstances should be seen as one of the abnormal periods for which some provision should have been made in the past. Although this was not done, it nevertheless would be a mistake to put the public finances in proper shape until the economy is in much better health. Indeed, as we argue on page 82, an internationally coordinated fiscal expansion offers the most plausible short-term means of supporting the international economy. But there are long-term costs and eventually fiscal soundness has to be re-established. Were the depression expected to be shortlived, there would be a case for pre-announced tax increases which could be suspended in the event of continuing weakness. However for a government now to announce tax increases to be introduced in 2011 is going beyond the practical political planning horizon. In the near term, we are likely to have to live with a fiscal framework which lacks credibility.
As we noted above, there has been much criticism of the fact that the Bank of England has continued to focus on inflation rather than cut interest rates in response to slowing growth and now falling output. The reality is that inflationary threats are much weaker than they were in July. The price of oil has fallen from its peak of $141/barrel to a current price of around $70/ barrel. It is perfectly true that the value of the US dollar has risen by over 10 per cent, but even in sterling terms, the oil price has fallen sharply. So too have other raw material prices. Bearing in mind also that the economy is much weaker than had seemed likely in July, the case for this month's interest rate reduction was clear. Nevertheless, not very much should be expected from the interest rate reduction. Lower interest rates will probably help the banks rebuild their profit margins but they will do little to stimulate demand if, as we expect, credit is tightly restricted. The past few years have given the impression that central banks believe they can, and actually can fine-tune the economy by means of interest rate changes. We have long been of the view that the impact of small changes to interest rates is overstated by the public -and perhaps also by the central banks themselves. We suggest on page 80 that an internationally co-ordinated reduction of 250 basis points would raise the growth rate by only about a quarter of a percentage point in the UK over the next year.
Comparisons are obviously being made with the 1929-33 depression which was felt most severely in the United States and in Germany. But there are a number of reasons for being much more positive. First of all, policymakers have been much earlier to recognise that they need to intervene. It is inconceivable that the banks in any advanced country could simply close as they did in 1932/3 in the United States; plainly they would be nationalised to allow the payments mechanism to continue to function. Secondly, prices are rising undesirably rapidly, whereas they fell in every year from 1929 to 1933. The current crisis may give rise to debt deflation, but there is as yet no sign of it. And it is likely that, should it start to occur, policymakers will be much more willing to monetise national debt than they ever have been in the past. We expect the United Kingdom to be the most affected of the advanced countries, but with a recession similar to that of 1990-92 rather than 1920-22 or 1929-32. 
